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19 May 1965

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

REVIEW OF INSURGENCY PROBLEMS

This publication provides a periodic review of internal security in underdeveloped countries where there is a threat from Communist-supported insurgency.

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Current Intelligence

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
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Review of Insurgency Problems

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2. Laos

The military situation continues to be quiet, but there are some indications of possible preparations for renewed Communist attacks. In northern Laos, road construction on Route 6 has reportedly been completed to a point 48 kilometers southwest of Sam Neua town and stockpiling of supplies is reported under way in this area. In southern Phong Saly Province recent Communist movements could foreshadow renewed pressure on government positions in this area. In the panhandle, no further significant troop movement has been reported on Route 23, but the 500 to 600 troops reported moving northward on 10 May apparently headed west on Route 12 toward the Mahaxay area. Truck traffic continues to be observed, but in numbers reduced from mid-April levels. Evidence provided by roadwatch teams suggests that the Communists may be cutting back on truck traffic in the panhandle prior to the advent of heavy rains. In past years, Route 23 became impassable in late May or early June.

In southern Laos, [redacted] Se Kong River south of the known terminus of Route 92 is apparently being used for the transport of supplies is a further indication that a system for logistic support of the Viet Cong has been developed in this area in the past several months.

3. Congo (Leopoldville)

The government's clean-up campaign is going well in the northeast, where rebels are on the defensive and increasingly short of supplies. Mercenary units based in Paulis are assembling materiel and organizing for an operation--now scheduled for this week end--against a large rebel group at Buta, 200 miles farther west. This may be an arduous undertaking because the route goes through dense tropical rainforest and the population is reported to be antigovernment. Other small hard-core rebel groups continue to harass government troops elsewhere in the northeast.

There have been no new border incidents between mercenary units and Congolese rebels coming

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from the Sudan and Uganda. Uganda is apparently controlling rebel activities near the border areas, but the Sudanese situation is unclear. Some rebel camps are still located around Maridi and Yei in the southwestern Sudan. Southern Sudanese dissidents have hampered Congolese rebel activities.

Other government positions in the northeast have been strengthened, and government control has been extended. Operations to clear both sides of the Congo River are also progressing slowly against faltering rebel resistance. Rebel activities have also diminished in the vast region inland from the left bank of the Congo River and southwest from Stanleyville to Boende.

With government operations in the north going well, the Fizi area in the east still remains the region of greatest concern. Rebels continue to press ANC positions along the North Katanagan border and to threaten Albertville. The Albertville-based Lake Tanganyika patrol now has apparently pinched off the flow of reinforcements to Fizi from rebel camps at Kigoma, Tanzania. Congo Army units from the Kindu area are also moving slowly along the western edge of this region. When the Buta operation is completed, Col. Hoare plans to transfer his forces there to Albertville to begin the clean-up of the Fizi stronghold.

4. Congo (Brazzaville)

The build-up of Congo (Brazzaville's) minuscule army by Communist and radical African states continues with the USSR emerging in a pre-eminent role. At least two shipments of military equipment, including about 20 artillery pieces, are now known to have arrived at Pointe Noire last month on Soviet vessels, and more Soviet deliveries--including an Algerian ship carrying Soviet arms--may be on the way. The Algerian merchant ship Tariq departed Algiers on 6 May carrying military trucks and possibly some military personnel and arms, reportedly for Pointe Noire.

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The Brazzaville army has neither the organization nor the capability to operate the equipment being supplied by the Soviets. In addition to about 50 French military advisers, there are now Soviet, Chinese, Egyptian, and Algerian military missions in Brazzaville engaged in both training and organizational work. It appears likely that these missions, particularly the Soviet one, will soon be enlarged.

6. Iraq

The government campaign against the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq is still in low gear. The army has pushed the Kurds out of the exposed positions they had occupied during the 14-month cease-fire in the foothills along the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan, but has made no attempt as yet to penetrate the mountain fastnesses that have long been held by the rebels. The government has begun bombing Kurdish villages, but this activity also is rather sporadic and is far short of the level of the systematic campaign carried out by the Iraqi Air Force two years ago. The rebels for their part have offered only token resistance to the army's occupation of the Kurdish foothills and have confined their own activities to guerrilla attacks and ambushes.

government appears undecided as to the course the fighting in the north should take. It appears likely that behind-the-scenes infighting is continuing between members of the regime who advocate a hard-line approach toward the rebels and an all-out attack upon them and those who press for a relatively moderate approach.

5. Sudan

Prospects for a settlement of the long-standing southern insurgent problem seem more remote than ever, the security situation in the three Negroid southern

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provinces is still deteriorating. Government forces are now said to control only major garrison towns and a few other areas. The rebels--loosely organized in a terrorist organization called the Anya Nya--reportedly collect taxes and administer their own laws in many outlying areas. Movement of government representatives outside the towns is extremely limited. Even the Southern Front organization in Khartoum--the spokesman body for southern political aims--exercises little direction over Anya Nya activities.

The joint north-south committee appointed at the March conference in Khartoum has made no real progress toward any political compromise, and no northern government is likely to agree to any real concessions to the south. Southern leaders demand the replacement with southerners of Arab officials who now hold most southern administrative posts, and removal of northern military forces in the area. Even if the government should agree to the administrative "southernization," however, there are probably not enough qualified southerners available at this time to fill the positions. The government's continued collaboration with the Congolese rebel movement and fears of possible border incursions by Tshombé's forces also make any reduction of military strength extremely unlikely at the present time.

A new government dominated by the generally moderate Umma Party will be formed in Khartoum within a few weeks, and Communist strength has been checked for the moment. Many Umma leaders have stated privately that they would like to disengage from the radical nationalist policies--including support for the Congo rebels--adopted by the leftist-influenced government which took office after the October coup. The Umma will move cautiously, however, and will probably be reluctant to make any drastic policy changes in the near future.

7. Thailand

Increasingly belligerent statements have been voiced by various Thai Communist front "representatives" in recent weeks. The statements come

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in the wake of a Communist propaganda campaign attacking the Thai Government's "involvement" with the US "imperialists" in South Vietnam and Laos.

At a gathering in Peiping in late April, "representatives" of the Thai Independence Movement, the Patriotic Front of Thailand, and the Thai Communist Party reiterated characteristic charges that the "Sarit-Thanom clique" has sold Thailand to US "imperialism." A more menacing tone was evident, however, in threats to "destroy" and "crush" the "enemy." This line was explicitly stated at the Asian-African Solidarity Conference on 11 May by a leader of the Patriotic Front when he warned that the Thai people were determined "to fight back with violence."

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In other developments, the Thai Government is reconsidering its policy with respect to the 40,000-strong Vietnamese community in the north-east. Plans involving the resettlement of the entire community to less sensitive areas are under study, but implementation faces serious logistic problems as well as a long-standing Thai reluctance to tamper with a community that has caused no trouble. Thai leaders may also still cling to hope that North Vietnam will resume its now-dormant repatriation program.

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On 30 April, the government released some 160 suspects arrested five or more years ago on grounds of involvement in Communist activities. Some 300 have been released since a rehabilitation program began in April 1964.

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8. Bolivia

Police and armed forces units moved effectively on the afternoon of 17 May to break up violent labor demonstrations in La Paz protesting the 15 May arrest and deportation of labor leader Juan Lechin. Before they dispersed, the mobs burned the Military Air Transport office and wrecked several vehicles. One demonstrator was killed and 27 people reportedly were wounded. Quiet was restored by the end of the day under a state of siege, but the calm may be only temporary. This marks the first occasion that army troops have been used against civilians since the military junta took power last November.

Although the junta was successful in quelling the labor demonstrations, a strike of nationalized mines and most railroads and factories remains in effect. Several mines have been taken over by the miners, and in at least one instance mine administrators are being held hostage, according to press reports.

It is unlikely, in view of the now serious deterioration in government-labor relations, that the strike will end without violence and the use of force.

9. Colombia

A variety of economic and political pressures threaten the survival of Colombia's National Front

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government under President Guillermo Valencia, at best an uncertain leader. The threat stems in part from power struggles within the coalition itself and from the increased strength of its opposition in Congress. In addition, popular discontent is widespread, and business and labor leaders are dissatisfied because government measures to combat inflation and devise a more equitable tax system have been inadequate.

Last January labor demands for tax and other reforms were so strong that the government averted a showdown only by establishing a commission to study the situation and agreeing to call a special session of Congress in late April to consider its recommendations. It is in this special session that the coalition and opposition power struggles now are taking place.

A "National Liberation Army" (ELN), estimated at about 500 men and women, including urban sympathizers, has formed around a cadre of at least twenty-two young insurgents trained in Cuba. A group of fifty of these men began guerrilla operations in January, and since that time Colombian officials have attributed to this "army" three armed assaults against Colombian towns.

Although the attacks may not have been of a high order of skill and effectiveness, they are significant in that they are political in purpose, and that they have so far gone relatively unpunished.

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[REDACTED] pro-Castro groups (including the ELN) are preparing further insurrectionary operations for the near future. Moreover, the insurgents are operating in a country which already has certain small parts of its territory virtually closed to legitimate government administration and control (the so-called Communist enclaves, ruled by armed, Communist-led bands). Attempts now are being made to establish ties between the ELN and other insurgent groups and the ELN already has liaison with the Venezuelan Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).

Military leaders are showing concern. They recently pledged their support to Valencia but dropped a thinly veiled warning that they would not tolerate his failure to take some remedial action soon.

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Civil defense committees are being set up in important provincial capitals to deal with growing delinquency and the increased number of kidnappings which have occurred in recent months. The committees are making plans for training in self-defense, the raising of civil defense funds, procurement of arms and ammunition, and for the encouragement of informing on bandits. Committees set up in Valle, Caldas, Northern Tolima, and eastern Cundinamarca will begin to operate immediately.

10. Guatemala

The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) may soon try to set off a progressive terrorist campaign against US installations and personnel.

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Although PGT capabilities and influence have declined in recent years, the party has contributed to the sporadic terrorism which has become endemic in Guatemala. In addition, the Communists are well aware that both rightists and Cuban-backed revolutionaries are waiting for any opportunity to act against the Peralta regime. Chances of setting off a chain reaction of subversive activity have recently been greatly improved by Peralta's heavy-handed political maneuvering, which has left no room for legitimate political opposition.

Most recently, widespread reports that Peralta will prolong his 20-month regime instead of holding elections promised for this fall have increased unrest and invited conspiracy. There are even signs of dissatisfaction among military officials who apparently feel that Peralta has used them and believe the armed forces are being compelled to share the onus of his actions.

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11. Venezuela

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
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Acts of terrorism in Venezuela during the past ten days have not been as frequent as in the previous week. Attacks against US property included machine-gunning of the US consul's residence and the US-Venezuelan Binational Center in Maracaibo on 11 May and the attempted bombing of the US consul's residence in Puerto La Cruz on 13 May. In addition, on 9 May terrorists dynamited a state-owned pipeline supplying the industrial center of Caracas, and on 12 May a group claiming membership in the FALN stole \$31,000 from a bank in Valencia.

12. Uruguay

In reaction to events in the Dominican Republic, Uruguayan Communist and leftist groups have begun a series of demonstrations and attacks on US-owned property. The US Chancery was attacked and stoned on 4 May and incendiary devices and bombs have since been set off against US business

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installations. Five demonstrators have been wounded in various riots and scuffles since 1 May, and police patrols and security precautions have been strengthened. Reports have been received of plans for Communist-led violence whenever security forces relax their vigilance.

13. Ecuador

The present reform-minded military junta is currently involved in a struggle to maintain power. Within the military there has been plotting, and some of the junta members have recently expressed disillusionment with power and have indicated willingness to install a civilian as head of a transitional government. Almost all politicians are in opposition and are attempting to concert viable alliances. Up to the moment, the junta has weathered all challenges, and has been favored by the inability of Communist subversives to concert successful insurgency. Growing unrest culminating in disturbances in Guayaquil have been brought under tenuous control only by determined use of martial law and military force.

14. Malawi

25X1 [redacted] the anti-Banda guerrilla activity in Malawi is fading. There have been no major attacks on Malawi towns since the raid on Fort Johnson in February, and the much-touted attack on the capital of Zomba never came off. Malawi forces continue to pursue the rebels who appear to be disorganized and leaderless in the countryside. Rebel leader [redacted] evidently is no longer in Malawi to lead the rebellion. Some of the roving bands who continue to commit violence may be engaging in common thuggery.

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There is evidence that Tanzania has given limited assistance to the rebel ministers in the form of money and some guerrilla training. Five of the rebel ministers remain in Dar es Salaam. Several armed bands have infiltrated the Tanzania-Malawi border during recent months, but they were

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dispersed by Malawi police before having any significant impact in Malawi. Tanzanian aid to the rebels might pay dividends in the long run, but the rebels' effort to date seems to have been half-hearted.

Prime Minister Banda has become more confident and has been moderating his repressive measures. He is taking steps to eliminate discontent--e.g., giving pay raises to the discontented civil servants, putting a rein on his Malawi Youth gangs--and has released large numbers of captured rebels.

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
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